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Ambivalent Solidarity 
Tisha Rajendra and Laurie Johnston 
In David Hollenbach's many discussions of the global common good, he 
makes frequent reference to the importance of solidariry as a fundamental 
component of that common good. We cannot adequately understand or 
work toward the common good without two forms of solidarity: first, a 
sense of our mutual interdependence and an openness to dialogue with 
the other-what Hollenbach calls "intellectual solidarity"-and second, a 
willingness to act in accord with that interdependence-"social solidariry." 
As the processes of globalization increase our interdependence, the risk is 
that exploitation, rather than genuine solidarity, comes to characterize this 
interdependence. 1 Globalization offers many opportunities to develop the 
virtue of solidarity, but it also poses the risk that the solidarity we develop 
may be only a flawed, incomplete form of solidarity, not true solidariry in 
justice. On the whole, Hollenbach is optimistic about the possibilities; he 
notes the many nongovernmental organizations and transnational move-
ments that are "working to move public opinion, national governments, 
and international institutions to adopt norms of action that reflect greater 
solidarity with those who are vulnerable and marginalized in the present 
global order." 2 Yet he also cautions that such movements may promote 
only partial, incomplete forms of solidarity: 
Many of these transnational movements working for global justice 
are somewhat paradoxically focused on concerns for particular 
groups of people-women, the poor, specific ethnic and cultural 
minorities. This poses the most challenging question raised by the 
phenomenon of globalization-how to achieve effective and universal 
' David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), l84ff. 
21bid., 238. 
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respect for the common hmnaniry of all people even in the midst 
of their differences.3 
He goes on to warn that th.e same type of interest-group politics that 
can distort democracy within the United States also poses a risk to justice 
and democracy on a global scale. For Hollenbach, solidarity that is par-
ticular is problematic; fiowever, we argue in this chapter that authentic 
solidariry can be expressed only through particular relationships between 
particular groups of people. YetiJ solidarity remains focused only on those 
particular relationships, it fa ii s to be truly virtuous. 
Genuine solidariry must inclllde specific practices that manifest an en-
during commitment ro particu la.r groups of suffering people. It is the par-
ticularity of specific others thatclraws our attention and elicits a particular 
response. However, limits on our time, resources, and attention prevent us 
from engaging in practices of solidarity with all suffering others at once. The 
paradox of solidariry is not thar it is at once both universal and particul.ar; 
it is that it is only throtLgh the practices of solidarity with specific suffering 
others can we attain tbe univ(!rsal solidariry that Hollenbach speaks of. 
And yet, as Hollenbach warns ,practices of solidarity can easily go amiss, 
resulting not in the developmem of universal solidarity, but in practices that 
actually blind us to the humani.ry and suffering of the other. How, then, can 
we ensure that particular practices of solidarity lead to the cultivation of 
universal solidarity ratlier than a deadening to the suffering of others? By 
drawing on a case study of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and the work of 
Martha Nussbaum, this article ilJuminates some aspects of the relationshi.p 
between particular practices ofsolidarity and universal solidarity. 
THE NATURE OF SOLIDARITY AND COMPASSION 
Christian ethicists frequently prioritize the universal dimension of soli-
darity-the solidarity that extends across borderlines. The paradigmatic 
example of universal solidari.ty is the parable of the Good Samaritan. 
The Samaritan overcomes the hisroric animosity between Samaritans and 
Jews to make an alliance with someone different. Citing this parable, Jon 
Sobrino uses the solidarity oHJS churches with Salvadoran churches as a 
case study for his examination. l>f solidarity across divisions of nationality, 
ethnicity, and economic standling.4 
1lbid. 
~Jon Sobrino, " Bearing with One ..Another in Faith: A Theological Analysis of Christian 
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Sobrino distinguishes solidarity from a mere "alliance of self-interest" 
precisely by drawing on this universal dime1rnon of solidarity. He stipu-
lates that solidarity mmt occur between "uncquals"-peoplc who are 
not only different from each other but who arc also unequal in social 
and economic standing. Solidarity acts as a bridge between groups of 
unequals, enabling them to enter into relarion"hips with one another 
despite their differences. 
Yet 111 examining Sabrina's case study, we can see that solidarity abo 
has a second dimension: besides the sense of universal humanity, there 1s 
a dimension that arises from the historical particularities of specific rela-
tionships. Among all the suffering peoples of the world, the US churches 
did not just choose the Salvadoran churches by chance; these relationships 
emerged in the particular context of the Salvadoran civil war, which was 
funded and supported b) the US government. In establishing relationships 
of solidarity with Salvadoran churches, the US churches were acting m 
defiance of the foreign policy of their own government. In cultivating 
this relationship of solidarity, the US churches were not only drawing on 
universal claims about the c.lignity of the peoples of El Salvador; they were 
also acting in the context of a particular-and problematic-relationship 
between the United Scates and El Salvador more generally. In cultivat-
ing bonds of solidarity w1ch Salvadoran churches, the US churches were 
attempting to change the nature of that relationship through particular 
inst1tut1ons and out of a particular bond of a shared religious tradlClon. 
Perhaps nothing points to the role of particularity in solidarity like 
compassion. We describe compassion as "suffering with"-a feeling in 
one\ own person elicited by the suffering of another. Bryan Massingale 
writes that compassion is "both the ground and the fruit of ... solidarity."~ 
In other words, solidarity arises from this emotional response ro the suf-
fering of another; but the virtue of solidartty also enlarges our hearts, 
enabling us to more powerfully feel the suffering of others. In Sobrino 's 
case study, the American churches were motivated by their emotional 
response to the horrendous suffering experienced by the Salvadoran 
people and the role of their own government in that conflict. Compas-
sion, in ocher words, point'> to the particular dimension of solidarit): it 
is nor generalized suffering that evokes compassion; it is the specifics of 
the suffering of particular, embodied others. 
Yet compassion does nor always lead to authentic solidarity. Often, 
'>olidam}·," 111 The Prmople of Mt•rcy: Takmg the Crucified l'l'ofJ/e from the Cross (M.iry-
knoll, NY: Orlm Boob, 1994 ), 14+-..,2. 
·Br>· an Massingale, Racial Justin• ,md the C1tl111/ic Umrc/J (Maryknoll, '\,'I: Orbis 
Book,, 2014), 118. 
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compassion and solidarity become divorced from the universal dimension. 
In what follows, we turn to a c1se study of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora 
and examine how and why CD1llpass1011 and solidarity with suffering oth-
ers went wrong 111 this case. 
THE SRI LAt'.KAN TAMIL DIASPORA 
From I 983 to 2009 Sri l.anka was ripped apart hy a brutal civil war 
that resulted in up to 100,00~ deaths. The roots of the conflict lie in the 
British colonial period, during which ethnic Tamils were given opportu-
nities for education and goH':rnmcnt positions were denied to many of 
the ma1ority Sinhalese. After Sn Lanka gained independence in 1948, 
Sinhalese-ma1onty government-:. enacted a series of d1scnmmacory policies 
against Tamils. Following a sen es of unsuccessful peaceful protests, many 
in the Tamil community begaa t<> place their hopes in armed militia groups 
seeking an independent Tamil state in the historic Tamil homelands of the 
north and east of the island. Jn July J 983 Tamil militants killed thirteen 
Sinhalese soldiers, setting off mob violence against Tamil civilians in the 
capital of Colombo. Jn the a ftennath of this pogrom, one militant group, 
the Libera non Tigers ofTamil Eelam (CITE), consolidated its power in the 
north and cast by assassinarin g members of other group'>. Meanwhile, the 
government of Sn l.anka hac.l 1hiftcd into war mode, ostemibly targeting 
the LITE while bombingciviljan areas indiscriminately, disappearing and 
detaining thousands of Tami]1~ and placing Tamil ma1oriry areas of Sri 
Lanka under military rule. The LITE responded with civilian bombings 
and massacres, aso;ass1nation ~ of Indian Prime M1111srer Rajiv Gandhi 
and Sn Lrnk.in President Raro<,inghc Premadasa, and an attempted as-
sassination of Sn Lankan Pre..,1dent Chandnka Kumararunga. The LTIF 
also inflicted terror on its own people, arresting and torturing dissidents, 
recruiting child soldiers, and ("<ecuting suspected informers. 
As a result of the conflict, 111ore than 500,000 Tamils left Sri Lanka 
in the years following the l 9 SJ riots. While many found themselves in 
refugee camps 111 the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, others fled for Canada, 
the United Kmgdom, and continental Europe. Due ro 1t'> generous asylum 
policies, Canada is home to the largest Tamil diaspora today. Although 
the Tamil d1;1Spora I'> by no means a homogenous group with one political 
agenda, many in the diasporn fi11anc1ally supported the LTff (frequently 
known as the Tamil Tigers) rhmugh thirty years of civil war. An insurgent 
group with a shoe'>tring budget, the l TIE had virtually no friends 111 
the international communit) and could nor have susramed such a long 
insurgency without the supp(lrt of the diaspora. Some in the diaspora 
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were coerced into funding the LITE, but much of the diaspora funded 
the LITE voluntarily. Though reports of the LITE's brutality against 
their own people were widespread and well known in the internationa l 
community, the diaspora seemed to turn a blind eye to reports of chi ld 
conscription, assassinations of Tamil moderates, and the use of civilians 
as human shields. ln the aftermath of the war, the diaspora has called for 
an investigation into war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan government 
against Tami l civilians; however, the diaspora has not called for a similar 
investigation into war crimes committed by the LITE.6 
Although the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora would have described itself as 
acting in solidarity with the civilian Tamils Living on the island, this is a 
case of flawed solidarity; the interventions chosen by the Tamil diaspora 
did not lead to peace nor to the flourishing of either Sri Lanka com-
munity or the international community. Solidarity is dependent on what 
Martha Nussbaum calls accurate "judgments of compassion."7 In order 
to examine why the solidarity of the diaspora went wrong, we examine 
Nussbaum's account of compassion as applied to the Tamil diaspora. 
Martha Nussbaum writes that compassion involves three separate judg-
ments. First, we must note that someone else is suffering and accurately 
assess the seriousness of the suffering. ls the suffering significant enough 
to truly affect a person's flourishing? The second judgment of compassion 
is whether the suffering is undeserved. The third judgment of compassion 
is whether the other's suffering affects the self in some way. 
The first judgment of compassion, accurately assessing the fact and 
the scope of another's suffering, requires openness ro reality and an ac-
curate judgment of reality. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora had no trouble 
accurately assessing the scope of the suffering of their compatriots. The 
first generation had themselves suffered directly either at the hands of the 
Sri Lankan government or at the hands of Sinhalese mobs during bouts 
of ethnic violence. Surely, they would have had no trouble imagining the 
suffering of Tamil civilians, nor would they have failed to see the seri-
ousness of their situations. However, there were a lso forms of suffering 
that most diaspora Tamils seem to have overlooked. Although it is nor 
reasonable to expect anyone to be fully aware of all the world's suffer-
ings, these forms of suffering were in fact quite proximate and relevant 
' International (mis (,roup, "The 'H• l .ankan l~1m1l D1aspora after the l Tri ,"I ehru;1ry 
23, 2010, www.c.:n\1~group.org, 1 S. See abo Report of rhe 011( I IR lnvesnganon on Sn 
Lanka (OlSL ), A/l IRC/30/CRP.2 (U111tec.I Nations l luman Rights Council, 2015 ) anc.I ln-
tern;monal Cnw .. Group, "War Cnmcs 1n Sn Lanka," !Viar 17, 2010, www.a1s1..,group.org. 
Martha Nussbaum, "Compa\s1on anc.I Terror," Dacda/11s U2, no. I (Wintt'r 2003): 
14-17. 
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to the Tamil population, partimlarly when they involved the recruitment 
of child soldiers. 
During the war, many in the diaspora were getting their news from 
only a few sources with a pro-I.TIE bias, such as TamilNet, a news source 
with a separatist agenda. Ma J()r news outlets in the West did not devote 
much space or time to the conflict, and the ones that did were consid-
ered by the diaspora ro have received one-sided information from rhe 
Sri Lankan government. Essentially, many in the diaspora had applied a 
cognitive filter to any news enierging from Sri Lanka: atrocities commit-
ted by the Sri Lankan government were real; atrocities committed by the 
LITE had been fabricated. A hhough it is common for humans to prefer 
information that confirms ou rown biases, there is a point ar which such 
bias constitutes culpable ignorance. 
Nussbaum's second judgme11t of compassion is whether the suffering is 
undeserved. One cannot make this ~econd judgment without the first. In 
other words, we are less likely to feel compassion for someone if we feel 
they have done something to CLrn their suffering. Nussbaum presents the 
example of a teenager who is jailed for torturing an ima Is; we are unlikely 
to feel much compassion for lu m. Yet if a criminal is given a punishment 
far more severe than would fit the crime, we may feel compassion for 
her, despite her guilt. But such complex judgments of desert frequently 
disappear in the polarized environment of a war, when "you're either 
with us or you're against us." For many Tamils, those who suffered at the 
hands of Sri Lankan govern01ent forces were generally perceived to be 
undeserving of such treatmellt. But this was not the same for those who 
suffered at the hands of the LTTE. 
This tendency to evade compassion by dismissing suffering as "de-
served" was applied not only 10 the Sinhalese civilians; Tamil moderates 
were also held to he deserving in some sense of their suffering. One 
example is Neelan Tiruchelv-am, a Tamil Member of Parliament who 
worked within the Sri Lankangovernment to craft laws that would give 
the predominantly Tamil nortliern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka a 
measure of political autonomr.For his work with the Sinhalcse-dominared 
Sri Lankan government and toward a nonviolent resolution of the war, 
Tiruchelvam was assassinate<! in 1999, presumably by the LITE. The 
LITE, whom he had publicly uiticized throughout his career, deemed him 
a traitor to his own people. Fo llowing the lead of the LT ff, the diaspora 
similarly dismissed Tiruchelva.01 as a traitor. In the polari1,ed environment 
of a civil war, this man who ac1i vely expressed solidarity with Tamils was 
nor regarded as deserving of 'i{)lidariry in return. 
The third judgment of con1passion likewise follows from the first and 
<;Ccond judgments. Nussbaum terms this the"eudaimonistic judgment"-
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the judgment that the suffering of another person affects us in some way. 
In the parlance of many Christian ethicists, this third judgment of compas-
sion is solidarity itself-the idea that because we are all interdependent, 
the suffering of one person affects another. This is what moves a person 
from merely suffering-with another person to acting to alleviate their 
suffering. Since the eudaimonistic judgment follows from the other two, 
flaws in the first two judgments prevented the Tamil diaspora from ap-
plying the eudaimonistic judgment to all who suffered from the war in Sri 
Lanka. Reporting based on interviews with members of the diaspora, the 
international Crisis Group states, "A palpable sense of guilt pervades the 
Tamil diaspora. Privately, some express shame for leaving Sri Lanka while 
other Tamils fought and died for the cause or fell victim to government 
violence." 8 The guilt is a manifestation of the eudaimonistic judgment. 
Of course, this eudaimonistic judgment had its limits. While the Tamil 
diaspora felt that they in some sense shared the fates of the Tamils on the 
island who were persecuted by the government, their sense of solidarity 
did not extend to the Sinhalese majority, who were perceived as deserv-
ing any suffering meted our by the LITE or the Sri Lankan government.9 
The Tamil feelings of bitterness toward the Sinhalese are not completely 
unwarranted; Sinhalese majority governments had been depriving Tamils 
of civil and political liberties since shortly after independence in 1948. A 
strand of Buddhism that emerged during British colonialism in Sri Lanka 
insists that the island must be an ethnically pure, Sinha la Buddhist state. 10 
The Sri Lankan army terrorized the Tamil civilian population, targeting 
sanctuaries, the Jaffna public library, and disappearing thousands, and 
few of the Sinhalese majority protested these war crimes. 
Authentic compassion, according to Nussbaum, requires accuracy in 
the three judgments. Thus the case of the Tamil diaspora illustrates fail-
ings in all three. Nussbaum's first judgment of compassion requires an 
openness to what Jon Sobrino, drawing on the work of Ignacio Ellacuria, 
would call " reality." But the filters applied to the news coming out of Sri 
Lanka simply erased the wrongdoing of the LITE. When the news of the 
LITE's activities became irrefutable, such as in the assassinations of Tamil 
moderates and civilian-targeted bombings, it was instead the second judg-
ment of compassion that failed: the victims of the LITE were taken to be 
deserving of their suffering in some sense. The third judgment of com pas-
1Inrernational Crisis Group Report, " Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTfE," 4. 
9See ibid., 4-5. 
10Eva Neumaier," Missed Opportunities: Buddhism and the Ethnic Strife in Sri Lanka 
and Tiber," in Religion and Peacebuilding, ed. Harold G. Coward and Gordon S. Smith 
(Albany: Stare University of New York Press, 2004), 69-92. 
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sion, solidarity, was also flawed: despite their tremendous compassion 
for the Tamils left behind in 5ri Lanka, suffering at the hands of the Sri 
Lankan government, tne Tam.ii diaspora not only failed to improve their 
lot but may have worsened it by funding the LITE and prolonging the 
war. Even now, when the future flourishing of Sri Lanka depends on a real 
reckoning with the past, the diaspora has not joined in the international 
calls for investigations of war crimes because such investigations would 
examine war crimes committed by the LTTE as well as those by the Sri 
Lankan government. This is a failure of the eudaimonistic judgment; for 
the diaspora, true soli.darity ' vould require a reassessment of their own 
role in the war. 
Not only do the second and third judgments of compassion follow 
from the first; all duee judgntents of compassion function together. If 
the suffering of the other can affect us, then the possibility of breaking 
through the wall of mi sin fonnation that surrounds us is much higher. 
For example, if the moral ima.ginarions of those in the diaspora could 
have extended compassion t() rhe Sinhalese victims of civilian bombings, 
or to the refugees i11 the diaspora who left Sri Lanka fleeing the Tigers 
rather than the Sri Lankan government, the diaspora might have been 
able to question the veracity of the news reported by TamilNet. Thus the 
eudaimonistic judgment could precede the other two and lead to more 
accurate information about both the fact of suffering and whether those 
who suffered deserved it, breaking through cognitive biases. That was 
the case with one member of the diaspora who went to Sri Lanka after 
the war and listened to famiJy members in the conflict zone tell stories 
of how in the last days of the war the LITE kidnapped children after 
shooting their parents. Jn thi s case the feeling of suffering-with led to a 
reevaluation of the news soL1rces he had relied on for yea rs. Only then 
could this member of the dias]Jora accurately assess the scope of suffering 
by Sri Lankans, both Tamils and Sinhalese. 
This anecdote also points ro another fact about solidarity. It is only 
the particulars of the sufferi11g other that can evoke the eudairnonistic 
judgment. When we allow an<Jther's suffering to affect us, it is usually the 
particulars of their suffering th.at draw us in. Perhaps we can hear in our 
imaginations the screams of the children who have witnessed the deaths 
of their parents and then been. kidnapped by their murderers. Or perhaps, 
in imagining the desperation of the parents to protect their children, we 
can imagine our own childrer1 ripped from our a rms. It is the particularity 
of these horrors that make our ears ring or our arms ache in sympathy 
with the parents who lost their children. However, solidarity cannot end 
with these particularities. 
When the third judgment of compassion is working properly, the 
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particula rity of the suffering o th er leads to a rea lization o f common 
humanity and interdependence. Approaching the other with eyes shaped 
by the euda imonistic judgment ca n perhaps lead to a more accurate sec-
ond judgment of compassion, assessing whether suffe ring is deserved or 
undeserved. If the Tamil d iaspora were able to see Sinha la civilians as in 
some way suffering at the hands of the same autocratic regime that ran 
roughshod over Tamil civilians in its quest to vanquish the LITE, they 
might have been a ble to see Sinhala civilia ns as similarly undeserving of 
suffe ring. True, Tamil civilians were victims of ethnic discrimination and 
exclusion , but it is a lso true that Sinhala civilians who spoke out aga inst 
their government were often a ssassinated or disappeared. 
These fa ilures of compassion are certainly no t unique to the Tamil 
diaspora . Many Sinha lese civilians could not make accurate judgments 
of compassion coward the Ta mils in che north nor th e refugees in the 
diaspora . Elsewhere, M a rtha N ussbaum detail s the ways in which the 
compassio n of America ns for the victims of 9/11 led to a na tiona lism that 
excluded Arab and South Asian immigrants.11 M ore recentl y, the 2015 
terrorise attacks in Pa ris rapidly erased many America ns' compassion for 
Syrian refugees and led many governo rs o f US states to try to bar the entry 
of Syrian refugees.12 The tend ency for compassio n to be deformed into 
something " narrow and self-serving" that divides us aga inst th e "other" 
is a symptom of huma n sinfulness that is universa l. 13 The Tamil case ca lls 
attention to the ways that a particular diaspora, beca use of their access to 
communications too ls and fin ancial resources in the West, can practice a 
flawed form of solida rity in a way that has significant consequences. Other 
diaspora popula tions play an important role in many conflicts around the 
world, bo th fo r good and ill-for example, the Irish American support for 
a peace accord in N orthern Irela nd a nd rad ica l nationa li st websites that 
stoked the confl ict in Bosnia. 14 C learly, moving coward peace and genuine 
solidarity requires a deepening of compassion in order to break w hat 
H ollenbach calls the "downwa rd spiral of self-defense a nd aggression." 15 
11Nussbaum, "Compassion and Terror," 11- 12. 
12Patrick H ealy and Ju lie Bosman, "GOP Governors Vow to Close Doors m Syrian 
Refugees," New York Times, November 16, 20 15 . 
11N ussbaum, "Compassion and Terror," l 1- 12. 
" See Daniel Bynam, Deadly Connections: States T hat Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) , 253, and Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: J:.xile 
Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, Y: Cornell University Press, 2003), 28. 
11David Hollenbach, "Socia l Eth ics under the Sign of the Cross," Annual of the Society 
o f Christian Etlncs 16 (1996): JO. 
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TOWARD SOLIDARITY UNDER THE SIGN OF THE CROSS 
Perha ps one of t he grea test mysteries of the human heart is why in 
some cases our experi ences of suffering lead us to feel compassio n and 
solidarity for o ther sufferers a rid in ocher cases che experience of suffer-
ing inspires only a defensive desire for control a nd self-preservation. The 
flawed, partial solidarity in tlte Tamil diaspora and other contexts might 
be seen as combining these two possible responses: it expands the eudai-
monistic judgment beyond the individua l self, but no t beyond one's own 
group- thus failing to move f rom the pa rticula r experience of suffe ring 
to a universal view. 
So many of the wo rld 's me>st importa nt movements for human rights 
arise precisely fro m experierice s of suffering, and yet so many o f the 
world 's most violent episodes .'.!lso arise from experiences of suffering a nd 
victim hood. Exposure to other s' suffering ca n produce similarly bifurcated 
responses, as H ollenbach expJa ins: 
The insta nta neous tra ns mis si<>n of television images of human suffer-
ing can . . . have bo th positive a nd nega tive influences o n the public 
sense of solid ariry and moral responsibil ity . . .. Repeated exposure 
to images o f violence a nd sta rva tion can give rise to public mo ra l 
disgust, leading to a hauglity sense o f superio rity, a deepened per-
ception of the divisio ns be1ween th e civilized " us" and the savage 
" them." Such disgust leads eith er to disengagement o r co a righteous 
quest fo r hegem ony in the 11ame of ci vilizati on .16 
H ow can we move toward b roadening o ur eudaimoniscic judgment 
coward the un iversal, so that we can practice gen uine solidarity whil e 
cultiva ting the kind of deep engagement with particula r persons that 
inspires solidari ty in the first place? As Christians, this is where we must 
turn to th e cross, the " preem jrient sign of ... di vine solida rity." It is in 
the cross, as H ollenbach wr ites, that we find the point of intersection 
between the pa rticular and the universa l, the compassion o f God a nd the 
suffering o f humanity: 
T he cross o f Jesus Christ does nor point to the preeminence of a 
kind of self-sacrifice t hat acq uiesces in vio lence or injustice. Rather, 
it un veil s the mystery at th e ~ea rt of the world as One who has utter 
compassion fo r a ll w ho suffer. The cross is the revelatio n o f divine 
1
•H ollenbach, Co111111011 Good , 237. 
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solidarity with every human whose experience is that of forsaken-
ness and abandonment. 17 .-,,_;ti.;· , • _,. , ,_,, ....... ,. 
The cross reassures us that the God of the universe is with us and 
with all who suffer. It is also a sign that calls us to enter into the suffer-
ing world, as Christ has. And it is, of course, "the most particularistic of 
all Christian symbols," as Hollenbach acknowledges. Yet he points out 
that it need not function as a sign for Christians alone; it also serves an 
important function as a general reminder of humanity's bloody history, 
which must not be ignored. "Followers of all religions and none must 
engage the questions raised by this history," Hollenbach writes." 
For Christians, the cross is a sign that the finite, time-bound, and of-
ten flawed ways that we attempt to express solidarity can ultimately be 
transformed by grace into something that strains toward the universal, 
the cosmic. Yet the universal mystery of the cross is one that is mediated 
through our own particular relationships. We experience Christ through 
one another; when we find refuge in a friend who can speak the words 
of compassion to us, it is then that our own suffering can bc<.:omc the 
grounds for compassion for others-rather than a source of anxiety and 
self-protection. When refugees find a genuine welcome, perhaps it is more 
likely that they may be able to develop a broader compassion as well. 
At a time when the world faces massive crises of migration, the demands 
of solidarity can appear exhausting. The world's religious communities 
must challenge themselves to draw on those elements of their traditions 
that nourish and deepen genuine solidarity with those who are suffer-
ing. For Christians, this means once again taking refuge under the cross, 
because, as Hollenbach writes, "It is here that we might discover a hope 
that is not based on the illusion that we control the world." And once we 
understand this, "We find the deepest source of strength to think and act 
in solidarity with those who suffer."'" c "'''Ht 
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